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Two important processes triggered by the collapse of Soviet-block communist 
regimes in East Central Europe in 1989-90: transition to and subsequent 
consolidation of democracy on the one hand, and, on the other, greatly 
increased international migrations in and out of that region, have each attracted 
considerable attention from, to use the coinages of Schmitter and Karl (1994), 
"transitologists" and "consolidologists" and migration specialists, respectively 
(see Pridham and Vanhanen 1994; Pridham, Herring, and Sanford 1997; Linz 
and Stepan 1996; Liebich and Warner 1995; Linz, Stepan and Gunther 1995; 
Whitehead 1996; Meyer 1993 for the former, and Hoerder and Moch 1996; 
Fassmann and Munz 1994; Gould and Findlay 1994; Rudolph and Morokvasic 
1993; Ardittis 1994; Castles and Miller 1993; Chesnais 1992 for the latter 
studies). In both fields theorists and researchers alike have emphasized the 
necessity to locate postcommunist democratization (Diamond and Plattner 
1996; Whitehead 1996; Pridham, Herring, and Sanford 1997; Hyde-Price 1994) 
and East-West migrations (Kritz and Zlotnik 1992; Cornelius, Martin and 
Hollifield 1994; Morawska and Spohn 1997) in the global context in order to 
understand their mechanisms and directions.’
The constitutive role of these two concurrent processes in the incorporation of 
East Central European (ECE) societies into the capitalist/democratic world 
system, their embededness in international relations, and their apparently 
"natural" affinity in view of the fact that the vast majority of contemporary ECE 
migrants travel to or come from Western societies that are the main source of 
the ideas and practical models of democracy for these postcommunist countries 
(Przeworski 1995, 3), should make the connection between international 
migrations and democratization a standard discussion issue in both study areas. 
Surprisingly, that has not been the case. Excepting a few occasional references 
to what migrants with Western experience could or should do for their 
democratizing countries (e.g., "act as carriers of values and behavioral patterns 
associated with successful democracies"1), the impact of international 
migrations on democratization processes in East Central Europe has thus far 
largely remained outside the purview of either democratic 
transition/consolidation or international migrations analyses. (My survey 
among specialists on international migration and democratic transition) 
consolidation in other parts of the world indicates that it has not been much 
studied elsewhere, either).2
An examination of the relationship between international migrations and, 
in particular, the movement to and from the Western world and the 
consolidation of democracy in present-day East Central Europe is worthwhile 
because of the reasons noted and because of the comparative-historical insights 
it can offer. Contemporary observers and historians of westbound travels from 
that region during the period of mass rural migrations one century ago (1880s-
While assuming the full responsibility for the final product, the author heartily wishes to 
thank all her colleagues-migration specialists-their names are listed in the appendix—who 
respondend to questions about the references, or lack thereof (in which case they were asked for 
comments) to democracy/democratization in their studies, and Philippe Schmitter for his helpful 



























































































1914), in the era of ECE's belated urbanization-industrialization and its 
incorporation into the capitalist Atlantic world-system, have documented an 
active role of the (e)migrants abroad as well as the returnees in the development 
of democratic ideas and practices in their home countries. Has a more 
"densified" and polydimensional interconnectedness of different parts of the 
world today in comparison with the prior century enhanced and, if so, in which 
ways and directions, the relationship between international migrations and 
democratic developments in the sending societies? Or have the political, 
socioeconomic, and cultural contexts of these processes, on the home or host 
sides of these flows or in the international sphere, or their actor-carriers 
themselves changed in ways that diminish or modify this impact?
In what follows I argue that, paradoxically in view of the rapidly 
expanding connectedness of East Central Europe with the Western world to 
which ECE residents travel en masse and from which originate the democratic 
ideas and practices implemented in their home countries, as the result of 
specific configurations of internal and external circumstances in which these 
travelers find themselves, the relationship between those international 
migrations and democratization processes in their home countries has generally 
weakened. What remains of this relationship has considerably "complexified" 
vis-a-vis the situation at the turn of the twentieth century. This exercise is 
intended primarily to initiate discussion and as a step toward a rapprochement 
of international migrations and democratization studies. Rather than a 
conclusive statement about the considered subject, its main purpose is to 
demonstrate one mode of such getting together through a comparative- 
historical analysis—an approach that this author, a historical sociologist, has 
applied in her studies of East European migrations and that is compatible with 
the recent appreciation among "consolidologists" of the contingency of 
democratization processes on time- and space-specific circumstances and their 
resulting diversity and underdeterminacy (see, e.g., The Transition to 
Democracy 1991; Pridham and Vanhanen 1994; Rengger 1997; Linz and 
Stepan 1996; Schmitter and Santiso 1998).
The focus of this discussion on East Central Europe, specifically, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary, rather than on the entire region of Eastern 
Europe has been dictated by the following considerations. All three countries 
received ratings above the minimal threshold of democratic practices on the 
Freedom House Scale of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Gastil 1994: 677- 
78); in comparison, 80% of the 26 countries of post-communist Europe scored 
"borderline" or "below" that threshold).
Past the transition stage, these countries are now in the democratic 
consolidation phase; their pending incorporation into the European Union 
moderates and accelerates this process, at least in its legal/procedural- 
institutional aspect (see table 1 for the dimensions of democracy relevant for 
successful consolidation). The primary destination of international migrations 
from those three countries is Western Europe/North America, which, as already 




























































































By comparison, elsewhere in the region these flows are mostly internal (CIS. 
excepting Jews and German Aussiedlers) or directed at East Central Europe 
(Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) which has the most advanced 
capitalist transformation in the region. These three ECE countries attract as 
well the largest numbers of highly skilled Westerners employed as facilitators 
of the transformation. The primary focus of the discussion is on the common 
features of the migration-democracy relationship in the three ECE countries. 
Within the limited scope of this paper, however, and to the extent the 
unsystematic data permit, when relevant for the issue under consideration here, 
the differences among Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are noted.
Two basic concepts inform this discussion: international migration and 
consolidation of democracy. The former is understood here as travel across 
state borders for purposes other than exclusively tourism, regardless of the 
duration of sojourn abroad. This encompassing definition of international 
migration has been dictated by the specificity of cross-statal travels of the 
residents of postcommunist East (Central) Europe and, in particular, the 
relatively short-distance or "borderland" and "pendel" nature of most of these 
migrations which are aimed mainly at generating or increasing income for 
individuals and households under pressure from capitalist transformation (after 
Iglicka, Jazwinska, and Okolski 1996, 18).
Besides the impact on home-country democratization of this largest 
category of migrants, I consider as well the influence of the emerging elite or 
"brain exchange" international travelers, including ECE highly skilled 
specialist-migrants, emigres/expatriates or members of the respective ethnic 
diasporas in the West who half-return or regularly visit their home countries, on 
the one hand, and, on the other, of Western (non-ECE) economic and business 
experts, international company employees, political consultants, and cultural 
advisors who come to Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic on shorter or 
longer sojourns. (The effect of the recent appearance in East Central Europe of 
migrants and refugees from non-European parts of the former Soviet Union, 
Asia, and Africa on popular us/others representations and ethnic/racial 
prejudices is treated as one among several components of the dominant profiles 
of cultural orientations [Kluckhohn 1950] in ECE migrants' home-countries 
that they take with(in) them while traveling to the West.)
The other concept requiring explanation is the consolidation of 
democracy.
It involves "substantial attitudinal support for and behavioral complaince with 
the democratic institutions and the 'rules of the game1 which they establish" 
(Linz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995, 3; see also Linz and Stepan 1996). Table 1 
contains the specification of the democratic institutions and "rules of the game" 
that require support of political elites and-a sine qua non of the successful 
progress of the consolidation of democracy—significant segments of the 




























































































Table 1. Constitutive elements of democracy
I. Democracy as a political system:
1. Government is elected by citizens and responsive to them
2. Government operates by parliamentary and majoritarian or consensual rules
3. Separation of judiciary, executive, and legislative powers
4. Government delegates and supervises carrying out of its "collective good functions
5. System of laws/regulatory frameworks guarantees (1),(2), (3) and (4) and protects civil 
liberties of citizens (freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and protection of individual and 
group rights against arbitrary state action) and the fundamentals of the "Democratic Creed" 
[(8)(9)( 10)])
II. Democracy as a form of community:
6. Existence of civil society or the plurality institutions and associations that operate 
independently from the state
7. Participation based on inclusion rather than exclusion and deriving from civic-universalist 
rather than ethnonationalist-particularistic criteria
HI. Democracy as a culture or set of normativelv binding concepts that inform social-political 
institutions and popular orientations:
8. Individualism, holding that the primary task of the government is to enable each individual 
to achieve the highest potential development
9. Liberty, which allows each individual the greatest amount of freedom consistent with 
order, and
9a.Postulating that individuals will cooperate in creating a wholesome society through the 
execution of their rights and duties through participation in civic-political affairs
10. Equality, maintaining that all people are created equal and have equal rights and 
opportunities
11. Deliberative-negotiatory (rather than zero-sum conformational) manner of resolving 
conflicts and building consensus
12. Respect for the institutions and processes o f political life and for their outcomes-laws, 
regulations, policies, and election returns—even if they are disliked
Sources:
-S.M.Lipset (ed.) (1995) The Encyclopedia od Democracy, Washington,D.C. 4vols.
-R.Dahl (1989) Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven.
-B.Tumer and P.Hamilton (eds) (1994) Citizenship: Critical Concepts, London.
-J.Linz and A.Stepan (1996)Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. 
Baltimore.
-P. Bimbaum et al. (1978) Democracy, Consensus, and Social Contract, London 
-L.Diamond and M.Plattner (eds) (1996) The Global Resurgence of Democracy. 
-A.Przeworski (1995) Sustainable Democracy. Cambridge.
-A.Lijphart (1989) "Democratic Political Systems: Types, Cases, Causes, and Consequences" 




























































































The constitutive elements of democracy specified in table 1 involve 
legal-political, social-communal, and cultural-normative aspects in their macro 
and micro dimensions, and represent the extensive interpretation of this 
concept, combining procedural (conflict management and resolution) and 
deliberative-participatory (shared effort toward the common good) elements (on 
these two projects of democracy see, e.g., Dahrendorf 1974; Marshall 1950; 
Turner and Hamilton 1994; Transition to Democracy 1991; Habermas 1993; 
Walzer 1995). The choice of a broad rather than a narrow definition is dictated 
in this case by subject matter. Spaces most readily accessible to migrants' 
potential influence are primarily located at mezzo-to-micro levels of the 
democratization processes, especially in the arenas of the civil society 
conceived as at once a normative principle, a style of organization, and a form 
of participation, the economic society as a set of sociopolitically crafted and 
accepted rules and institutions that mediate between state and market, and 
local-to-middle levels of the political society, including, in particular, political 
parties and leadership and legislative bodies (after Linz and Stepan 1996, 7-14). 
These arenas, or phrasing of Schmitter (1995), "partial regimes" of 
consolidation processes are interdependent but vary in distinctive ways 
propelled by somewhat different sets of circumstances; they change at different 
paces and in nonindentical sequences.
I have used a variety of sources. Besides (sub)regional and individual 
country studies of democratization and international migration in 
postcommunist East Central Europe to provide broader explanatory contexts for 
the presence (or absence), arenas, and forms of relationship between these two 
processes, I have examined some twenty social surveys and ethnographic 
studies conducted during the 1990s in ECE and Western destination countries 
of (e)migrants from that region, drawing as well from my own ongoing 
comparative study of East European migrants' social microenvironments in 
Berlin and Philadelphia. In these studies 1 looked for and noted all, even 
passing, information about actual and potential travelers' "because o f  and "in 
order to" purposes (Schütz 1962) of westbound migration, reasons for their 
preferences for particular destination countries, pre-migration expectations and 
after-return evaluations of the specific gains and losses from sojourns abroad 
for individual migrants and their families and for their local communities and 
for the country at large. In addition, I have inspected ECE press reportages and 
secondary analyses thereof on transnational population movements, in 
particular those dealing with the influx into that region of repatriate members of 
ethnic diasporas and Western highly skilled personnel, and with westbound 
migrations of ECE businessmen and professionals on the one hand, and, on the 
other, with "[cross-jborderland" movements between the three ECE countries 
considered here and Austria and Germany. I also examined the available 
statistical data on (registered) joint business/industrial ventures involving ECE 
and Western partners. Because a considerable number of the (above) sources 
dealing with contemporary ECE migrants did not contain any or only 
occasional references to the issues related to democracy/democratization, I 
personally contacted sixteen authors of these reports, five additional ECE 




























































































European Migrations held in December 1997 in Pultusk, Poland, and two 
authors of the extensive press reportages on recent borderland migrations in 
that region, asking them to comment on issues of interest to me.
The information I have obtained from these sources has been sufficient to 
propose a preliminary interpretation of the impact of post-communist-era 
international migrations on democratization processes in East Central Europe. 
Unavoidably, however, given the lack of studies directly focused on this 
relationship, it has been far from statisfactory. Although one of my main theses, 
namely, that the democratic influence of the largest segment of present-day 
migrants has thus far been nearly nonexistent, is convincingly sustained by the 
analysis of contextual pressures on the sending and the receiving sides of 
migration, a considerable part of this proposition’s empirical support comes 
from the researchers' and/or migrant-actors' "silence" on this issue. Although 
my follow-up questionning of the authors of the examined studies did make up 
for this shortcoming to some extent, explicit investigations, preferably 
interdisciplinary, are needed of the link between international migration and 
democratization.
This discussion has been informed by the conceptualization of different 
arenas of social life: the economy, politics, social relations, material and 
symbolic culture, not as separate structures but as criss-crossing reciprocal 
constructions, each structured by and structuring the other through human 
action and its intended and unintended consequences. Whereas the long-term 
and immediate configurations and pressures of forces at the upper structural 
layers set the limits of the possible and the impossible within which people act, 
it is at the level of the more proximate surroundings that individuals and groups 
evaluate their situations, define purposes, and undertake actions the intended 
and, often, unintended consequences of which, in turn, affect over time these 
larger-scope phenomena. (On the structuration model of society see Giddens 
1976, 1984; Sewell 1992; on migration as structuration process see Morawska 
1998; on the configurational analysis in comparative-historical sociology see 
Skocpol 1984; Ragin 1987.) The major macro- and micro-level factors that, as I 
argue, have in different configurations shaped the relationship between 
different types of contemporary westbound migrations and democratization 
processes in ECE are listed in table 2. The discussion of these configurations 
and their influence on the migration-democracy relationship has been set 





























































































Table 2. Major factors influencing the relationship of migration- 
democratization*
I. The sending societies:
-economic structure and developmental dynamics 
-political (state) independence and form of government
-prevailing orientation(s), laws and policies regarding state-national membership: civic- 
universalist v. ethnonationalist-particularist 
-official and popular civic-political culture/practice regarding, in particular:
(i) respect for the law
(ii) trust in public institutions and their functionaries
(iii) negotatiatory v. confrontational approach to conflict resolution
II. The receiving societies:
-economic structure and dynamics 
-"health" and vitality of the democratic system 
-immigration policies
-degree of sociopolitical isolation/integration from/into mainstream society of (im)migrants 
and availability to the latter of models of democratic procedures and organization
III. International relations:
-international power politics, pressures and conflicts/disagreements, especially involving 
home-countries/region of (im)migrants
-involvement of (im)migrants’ home-countries/region in international agreements and 
institutions regulating/monitoring trans-statal population flows to and frm these 
countries/region on the one hand, and, on the other, the latter’s compliance with the 
democratic requirements(G:clear these democr.requirements;rules? prescriptions
IV. Characteristics of (im)migrants:
-economic status/location in the sending and the receiving society
-political status in the receiving society
-duration of stay abroad
-scope and nature of contacts with natives
-intra-group organization of (im)migrants
-accustomed orientations regarding
(i) collective self/other perceptions
(ii) authority (especially state and law)
(iii) civic-political involvement
(iv) resolution of interpersonal and intergroup differences/conflicts
All the specified here factors are conceived not as fixed states/ conditions but, in accord 




























































































Arbeits- and Handelstouristen and Democratization in ECE
The largest category of post-1989 ECE international migrants: the income- 
seeking Arbeitstouristen and Handelstouristen, has been directed primarily to 
Western Europe (85%), especially to nearby Germany and Austria, and then to 
Scandinavia, France, and, increasingly, Italy; and across the Atlantic to North 
America (15%). Because a large proportion of those quasi-tourists remain and 
engage in work abroad without appropriate immigration documents or 
circumvent customs regulations by hiding the quantity of merchandise they 
carry or smuggle, only estimates of their numbers compiled from border­
crossing statistics and studies of such "grey area" migrants are available. The 
volume of contemporary economic migrations from East Central Europe has 
increased enormously compared to similar flows of one century ago. Thus, in 
1995 alone the volume of income-seeking travels of East Central Europeans, 
including short-term back-and-forth small business/trading moves across statal 
borders (but excluding noncommercial shopping trips), estimated at 25-30 
million "crossings," about equaled the volume of mass international migrations 
za chlebem (after bread) in that region during the thirty years preceding World 
War I. (In comparison, the number of legal or contract ECE migrant workers 
reported in the West totaled 400,000-450,000 in 1995; for the estimates of 
present-day international migrations of East Central Europeans see Frejka 
1996; Trends in International MigrationJSOPEMI 1996; Tourism in Central 
and Eastern Europe/ECC 1995; Morokvasic and Rudolph 1996; on 
contemporary versus tum-of-the-century flows see Morawska and Spohn 1997; 
Morawska 1998.)
Of the three countries considered here and in proportion to the total 
number of international migrants from each of them, Poles have engaged in 
such indocumentado work and unreported commercial trade during their 
sojourns abroad considerably more often than have either Czechs or 
Hungarians. Between-country differences in the migration plans correspond to 
those in the volume of actual travels. According to 1994-95 surveys of ECE's 
intentions to migrate temporarily to Western countries to earn money, between 
35% and 60% of Poles, 33% and 48% of Czechs, but only 10%-15% of 
Hungarians reported having such plans (after Berencsi and Sik 1995; Juhasz 
1996; Slany 1996; Okolski 1996a, 1996b; Maresova 1996; Fassmann 1996; 
Uhlirova 1997).3
Available data reveal the following sociodemographic characteristics of 
income/work-seeking migrants (between-country differences have not been 
siginficant). Most of them (more than 70%) have been urban residents; men 
have been more numerous (about 60%) than women;4 in both gender groups 
migrants 30 to 40 years of age have predominated; a majority (52%-58%) have 
had middle-level education; and a considerable proportion (15%-25%) of them 
have been unemployed at the time of migration (compiled from Fassmann et al. 
1996; Maresova 1996; Juhasz 1996; Morokvasic 1996; Okolski 1996a; Slany 




























































































Asked about motives for their travel abroad, between 85% and 95% of 
migrants have pointed solely to economic reasons: to help their families make 
ends meet, or, increasingly since the early 1990s, to improve their living 
standards. "Learning about the world" as an accompanying motive has been 
mentioned by 7%-15% of respondents. (This and the following data pertain 
mostly to shorter- and middle-term tourist-workers, actual and those who 
planned such trips at the time of the survey/interview; they were compiled from 
Frejka 1996; Slany 1997;5 Cieslinska 1998; Okolski 1996b; Misiak 1995; 
Jazwinska and Okolski 1996; Karpiuk 1997; Siewiera 1995; Berencsi and Sik 
1995; Cyrus 1995, 1995a; Morokvasic 1996; Poplawski 1995; Mydel and 
Fassmann 1997; Morawska [study in progress]; see also Fassmann et al. 1996). 
Not surprisingly, considering the dominant purpose of migrants' travel abroad, 
their images of the West in general and the particular countries they chose as 
their destinations predominantly focused on that part of world's economic 
affluence and high standard of living, and on much better than at home 
opportunities to earn and save money. (The 1995 GNP ratio of East Central 
European and West European/North American countries was 1:3, and that of 
average official ECE wages and average migrant income in Western informal 
economy 1: 5-106.) With no significant between-country differences, references 
to democratic politics or culture in the West as the appealing features, such as 
public order/security, rule of law, "good political climate," civil (kind) behavior 
in social relations, appeared, if at all, in no more than l%-3% of answers in 
both closed (preset categories) and open-ended questions.7
Ethnographic and ethnosurvey studies of present-day westbound travels 
of East Central Europeans have also inquired about migrants' experience during 
their sojourns abroad and the effects of such migrations on their own and 
families' lives and for their local communities. Migrants' answers reflect, again, 
the primarily economic or income-seeking character of their Western sojourns. 
Regarding experience abroad, they focus on the opportunities to find and 
maintain work, working conditions, and, most of all, earnings and savings. 
Recurrent noneconomic motives have been here the experience of being treated 
"like inferiors" or "like dirt" and the underlying anxiety of being apprehended 
or actually having to cope with pending deportations and prohibitions against 
return. Occasionally, Western "lack of spiritual values" (contrasted with 
migrants' national culture) and the "brutality" of life have also been mentioned, 
but more constructive encounters with Western democratic ideas or institutions 
have been by and largely missing from these migrants' stories.
The gains from international migration for the respondents' families and 
local communities have likewise been perceived in almost exclusively 
economic/material terms. (The questions probing these issues were generally 
open-ended, leaving respondents the freedom of answer) For individual 
families members' Western migration permitted, first and foremost, consumer 
purchases (house/apartment, car, household amenities) and, thus, the elevation 
of social status that they could not have accomplished without it. Between 10% 
and 15% of the returnees founded business entreprises—an investment that, if 




























































































the democratic ways in the arena of economic society, thus making 
international migration a background generating factor (see the next section on 
this category of migrants).
Local communities also gained from international migrations of their 
residents. (This question was addressed to residents of migrant communities at 
large.) The predominant evaluations pointed to the influx of money and 
increase of economic affluence and/or decrease of unemployment; possible 
effects on the local democracy, whether in the sphere of political or civil 
society have not been mentioned at all.8 The question about the effects of 
(outward) temporary migrations for the respective ECE countries posed in 
public opinion surveys elicited similar evaluations in contents and emphases. 
The nearly exclusive economic focus and the absence of references to this 
category of migrants' impact on or involvement in the democracy-strenghtening 
activities/ institutions in their home countries/local communities in press 
reportages on cross-border migrations in ECE or analyses thereof confirm the 
above findings.
Because in social survey and ethnographic studies of migration 
references to the issue(s) of democracy have been miniscule and generally 
without commentary, and press reports have been largely silent on these 
matters, I asked their authors, particularly those who have done "hands on" 
participatory research, to elaborate, as much as they could, on these 
fmdings/nonfindings. Their follow-up comments on the data and "impressions 
from the field" by and large support my tentative conclusion. Except by 
deflating possible erruptions "from below" in protest against pains and traumas 
of the economic transformation by providing the subsidiary work and income 
abroad (certainly not a bagatelle facilitator of democratic consolidation), and by 
creating potential "democratic investment" for the future in the minority of 
migrants who invest their savings in businesses, the largest contingent of 
contemporary westbound migrants has had a minimal or nonexistent impact on 
the consolidation of democracy in postcommunist East Central Europe.
This conclusion is intriguing in two ways. First, it suggests that rather 
than acting as an integral facilitator of the consolidation of democracy (see 
Whithead 1996), the international and, specifically, Western "entanglement" of 
postcommunist East Central Europe, has had differentiated and possibly 
contradictory effects on this process. Specifically, one important "link" in this 
interconnectedness, westbound travels of the immense numbers of that region's 
residents (especially Poles), has had an inconsequential or, as argue below, 
possibly even a negative impact. Second, it stands in sharp contrast to the 
already mentioned historical reports on the democratic involvement, both in the 
destination and, after return, the home societies of the tum-of-the-century 
predecessors of contemporary ECE income-seeking travelers, and, especially, 
so-called Amerikanci or peasant-migrants to the United States-the "land of 
dollars" in popular representations. Amerikanci constituted about one-third of 
the total westbound population movements from that region between the 1880s 




























































































eventually did return to their home countries. (East European Jews, whose 
emigration was permanent, were the exception and have been excluded from 
this discussion. On 1880-1914 ECE international population movements, see 
Hoerder and Moch 1996; Nugent 1992; Bade 1992; Berger 19839).
Democratic initiatives of tum-of-the-century migrants were neither 
forceful enough nor sufficiently long and deeply embedded in social forms and 
political institutions of East Central Europe still waist-deep in the remnants of 
the feudal past really to transform them before several closely following 
adversarial developments "from above" (two devastating World Wars separated 
by the Great Depression of the 1930s and followed by the communist takeover 
in 1945) eradicated and destroyed these budding developments. But they were 
visible enough to be recorded by contemporaries and involved several elements 
of democratization at local and national levels as well, including the founding 
of People's Houses and agricultural cooperatives in villages, active 
participation in emergent labor unions in the cities, promotion of democratic 
ways in the forming peasant and working-class political parties, and (an 
important "demonstration effect" for migrants' countrymen only one or two 
generations removed from feudal serfdom)10 the newly acquired sense of 
independent personhood or "you don't have to be poddanem [subordinate] to 
anyone," and the value of individual and collective liberties. (On these 
activities of tum-of-the-century ECE peasant-migrants in their home countries 
see Balch 1910; Bujak 1901, 1902; Slomka 1941; Witos 1968; Greene 1975; 
Morawska 1993; Wyman 1993; Puskas 1982; Stolarik 1980; also collections of 
(im)migrants' letters—more than 3 million of them arrived in East Europe from 
the United States between 1900 and 1906—sent to their families and friends in 
the villages, e.g. Kula et al. 1986; Drozdowski 1977.)
I briefly sketch below the major circumstances that induced tum-of-the- 
century migrants' participation in democratic activities and then, against this 
comparative background, outline the configuration of factors that greatly 
diminish or even corrupt this "democratic impulse" among their contemporaries 
(table 3 presents summary data on the economic background and selected 
sociodemographic characteristics of the 20th/21st- versus 19th/20th-centuries 




























































































Table 3. ECE Migrations in a Historical Perspective: 20th/21st v. 19th/20th 
Centuries
1. Average ratios o f ECE/NW (W.Europe and U.S.A. combined) per capita GNP and monthly 
wages




1913: 1:3 to 6 
1994: 1:5 to 10
2. Volumes, frequency, and destinations of ECE international migrations
-Estimations of volume:
1870-1914: 25-30 million westbound "comings" and "goings";
1990s: 50-60 million 
-Frequency:
1890-1910: average 1-2 annual trips per migrant 
1990s: 5-6
-Most common destinations:
1870-1914: Germany, U.S.A., Austria
1990s: Germany, Austria, Scandinavia, Italy, U.S.A.
3. ECE migrants' occupational and gender distribution
-Occupational distribution:
1880-1914: 95% in agricultural occupations (Jews—80% in small trade and 
handicrafts);
1990s: ca 65% in manufacturing/construction and services 
ca 15% in professions (Jew s-ca 65% in professions)
-Gender distribution:
1880-1914: proportion of women 25% to 40% (Jews—ca 50%);
1990s: proportion of women 40% to 70%
4. Most common migration types
1880-1914: middle-to-longer-duration or permanent income-
seeking/economic type (Jews:political-economic);
1990s: short-to-middle-duration (Jews:permanent)
-tourism combined with trade or undocumented 
employment;
-family/friends visiting combined with 
undocumented employment;
"pendel" trade and/or employment
5. Most common assistance networks
1880-1914: informal networks (family at home and abroad, neighbors);
1990s: informal networks (family/friends at home and abroad, ethnic 
communities abroad; native employers and friends/acquaintances abroad); 





























































































The units of comparison on the destination side are not identical-the 
conditions obtaining in the American society at the turn of the twentieth 
century, and, in the present, those in Western Europe (primarily) and America. 
Considering, however, that neither the relevant surrounding circumstances nor 
the position of contemporary ECE income-seeking migrants (minority) in the 
United States differ significantly from those of their (majority) fellow regionals 
in Western Europe and that the available data on "American” versus "West 
European" ECE migrants' experience of democracy abroad and subsequent 
involvment in democratization at home do not reveal any substantial 
differences, making such a comparison is justified.
A configuration of major factors "opened up" tum-of-the-century 
international migrants to democratic influences. Of primary importance on the 
sending (ECE) side was the multiple state of becoming or transition from 
feudal corporatism and ascription-based sense of selfhood and social 
organization, and Heimat or local (rather than Vaterland or broader-scope; see 
Ossowski 1967 on this distinction) collective attachments to modem civic- 
political and sociocultural commitments and identities among East Central 
European rural populations as the major source of tum-of-the-century 
westbound, also American, migrations. This situation of loosened old forms 
and unsettled new ones combined with those income-seeking peasant-travelers’ 
genuine curiosity (documented in contemporary ethnographic studies and 
(im)migrant letters) about the faraway world into which they could and had 
ventured for the first time, facilitated their absorption of new ideas and 
practices. Their American sojourns provided the opportunity to experience and 
learn such new democratic ideas and practices. (A much smaller number of 
ECE peasant migrants who in that same period traveled to South America 
encountered a quite different social-poltical order and acquired a different civic 
knowledge and know-how-see, e.g., Kula 1982, 1983).
As unskilled industrial laborers (95 per cent of non-Jewish foreign-bom 
East Central Europeans in American cities were so employed in 1910), 
(im)migrants found themselves at the bottom but right within one of the main 
sectors of the host society's economic structure. In several branches of industry 
(e.g., most of coal and steel and meat-packing companies that employed large 
numbers of ECE workers) they participated in labor union activities as early as 
the 1900s, learning through this experience the democratic skills of worker 
interest representation, the art of negotation, the forms of protest and so on. In 
public institutions and in stores they observed an informal, egalitarian style of 
social relations: "In the office and in the bank, everywhere they treat a man 
with respect whether he is dressed up [in a genteel fashion] or dirty [from 
work" (after Drozdowski 1977, 477; this and the following information 
pertaining to tum-of-the-twentieth-century migrants' democratic experience in 
America has been compiled from Park 1922; Thomas and Znaniecki 1918; 
Greene 1975; Hoerder 1985; Bodnar 1985; Walaszek 1994; Harzig and 




























































































Although middle-class native-born Americans (WASPS) perceived new 
(im)migrants from underdeveloped South-Eastern Europe as culturally inferior 
or "undercivilized," the spirit of Progressive Reform dictated that they assist 
these newcomers in embracing American civic-political ideals and the 
American way of life (see Timberlake 1966; Greenwald and Anderson 1996). 
Through so-called Settlement Houses established by WASP Progressives in 
foreign neighborhoods in most American cities in which the newcomers settled 
in greater numbers, (im)migrants were taught concepts and ideas entirely new 
in their experience: the principles of the "American creed" and rights and duties 
of citizenship and the procedures of democratic laws and government. In their 
neighborhoods, they also experienced practical workings of political democracy 
during local and national elections; although motivated primarily by the desire 
to augment their electorate, local representatives of the political parties combed 
(im)migrant neighborhoods, soliciting their residents to fill out naturalization 
papers to become citizens and—a revolutionary idea for peasant-migrants from 
postfeudal East Europe-"influence the affairs of America."
Important, too, for their apprenticeship in the workings of a democratic 
civic society, for the first time during their sojourn in America East Central 
European peasant-(im)migrants began to organize themselves, using the know­
how acquired in Settlement Houses and American civics classes, into various 
mutual help and expressive associations. Among the variety of sociocultural 
institutions they created, those promoting translocal national consciousness and 
symbolic attachments to, in Benedict Anderson’s famous phrase, "imagined 
communities" as Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and so on, were particularly 
innovative. The Lithuanians referred to the United States as "the second 
birthplace of the[ir] nationality," and the same may be said of others as well 
(Park 1922, 51). These emerging national self-perceptions had been a new 
experience for millions of peasant-(im)migrants who came to the United States 
with the Heimat, or local, (region or community) rather than broader, national, 
or Vaterland identities (Ossowski 1967). Unlike their fellow ethnics in their 
home countries, however, whose acculturation into larger national communities 
occurred under immediate political oppression of their respective national 
groups by Russia, Germany, and Austria as regional superpowers that made the 
exclusionary "zero-sum” opposition of us/ingroup versus them/outgroup(s) the 
central theme in these emerging identities, the "nationalization" process of the 
Amerikanci, even though it unavoidably contained home-country motives of 
struggles against enemies,11 took place in a democratic environment and in a 
democratic manner.
None of the conditions that induced democratic involvement of tum-of- 
the-century ECE international travelers are present today and replacement 
facilitators scarcely exist; rather, multiple obstacles to such an engagement 
have emerged in the circumstances of contemporary migrants from that region.
On the side of the sending ECE societies and, specifically, the popular 
Weltanschauungen and accustomed practices of their citizens, including 




























































































following. In comparison with their predecessors one century ago who, too, 
were set in motion by large-scale socioeconomic transformations of their 
societies but for whom the notions of democracy and civic-national 
participation encountered during their Western sojourns represented entirely 
new and exciting ideas, contemporary migrants leave their home-countries and 
arrive at their destinations abroad encumbered by several undemocratic 
preconceptions and deeply embedded habits.
One of them has been the understanding of democracy prevalent in East 
Central Europe. During the communist era and by way of opposition to that 
politically authoritarian and economically inefficient regime, there formed a 
largely implicit (and outspoken in dissident circles) popular understanding of 
democracy as involving three elements "rolled into one": freedom from state 
controls (understood as the elimination of the communist regime), economic 
affluence for all, and regaining of national sovereignties by state-members of 
the "socialist family" controlled by the Kremlin (Whitehead 1996, 386; see also 
Przeworski 1995; Pehe 1988; Pridham and Vanhanen 1994; Meyer 1993; 
Liebich and Warner 1995). The collapse of the Soviet-dominated communist 
order was viewed as equivalent to the establishment of the Western-like 
capitalist-democratic one.
Although post-1989/90 experience of "real (capitalist) democracy" (like 
"real socialism"-see Marody 1996) and increased contacts with the Western 
world have been gradually bringing these representations closer to reality by 
making them more contradictory, two constitutive components of this fused 
image formed in the communist era—democracy understood primarily as 
individual and collective "negative freedom" from state legal and political- 
institutional constraints (elements 1/5, II/6, and III/8 and 9 in table 1) and as the 
system that cares for its poor and weak (1/4) but at the same time assures 
economic affluence for everybody-have endured in popular understanding. 
Absent by and large from these common representations have thus far been the 
constitutive elements of "positive freedom" (II/7, III/9a, 11 and 12) as 
necessary contributors to the construction of a stable functional democracy (see 
Bruszt and Simon 1992; Siemienska 1997; Ingelhart 1996; Szelenyi, Szelenyi, 
and Poster 1996; Klingeman and Fuchs 1995; Liebich and Warner 1995; 
Kolarska-Bobinska 1998; Juhasz 1996; on the distinction between negative and 
positive freedoms see Berlin 1968).
The regaining of state-national sovereignty by East Central European 
societies has been indeed realized with the collapse of communist regimes in 
the region. But it has not eliminated the widespread preconceptions underlying 
these national aspirations that are incompatible with the principles of a 
democratic community (especially element II/7 in table 1) and a democratic 
culture (especially elements III/9 and 9a and regarding "equal liberties" for all 
law-abiding citizens and the groups they represent). Some (vocal) segments of 
these societies even reinforced these ideas by bringing them out into the public 
area. They involve, in particular, national orientations and group self­




























































































particularistic rather than civic-universalist principles. Whereas civic- 
universalist nationalism has relied in principle on voluntary commitment and. 
therefore, flexible criteria of membership in the national collectivity and on the 
legal-democratic, deliberative process in resolving intergroup tensions, in the 
ethnic-particularistic nationalism this membership is viewed as inherent and. 
thus, impossible to achieve for those who do not have it or to abandon for those 
bom into it, and intergroup conflicts are viewed as and dealt with in a 
manicheian fashion as the confrontations of good and evil forces that cannot be 
resolved through negotiations and compromise. (On these two traditions of 
nationalism and the historical circumstances of the emergence of the latter type 
in East Europe see Kohn 1961; Connor 1994; Greenfeld 1992; Sugar and 
Lederer 1969; also Chirot 1989; Berend and Ranki 1974, 1982.)
Although national traditions of all three East Central European countries 
considered here have also contained the universalist-democratic component, it 
has been most alive in the collective memory and as part of contemporary 
national self-representations among the Czechs who, including present-day 
migrants, are in this sense less encumbered or better prepared mentally for 
functional democracy than their Polish and Hungarian fellow regionals. (On 
Thomas Masaryk and interwar Czechoslovakia's democratic order as relevant 
identificational references for postcommunist political leaders and public 
discourse see Krejci and Machonin 1996; Wolchik 1994; Svatek 1993; Batt 
1997; but see Gellner 1983 on a particularist-exclusive element in this 
universalist-democratic tradition of Czech nationalism, namely, a tendency to 
view it(self) as unique and preceding all others.)
Unsolved problems with ethnic/national minorities within and outside of 
these three countries contribute to the persistence and often enhancement of 
particularistic-exclusionary nationalist orientations in the region. In this regard 
Hungary which has a large (1,6 min) and discontented minority in Romania and 
sizeble and equally dissatisfied populations of Slovaks and Romanians (more 
than 0,5 million combined) within its borders, has entered the process of 
postcommunist transformation more encumbered by a ballast of undemocratic 
popular attitudes than has either Poland or the Czech Republic, both at present 
basically homogeneous in their ethnic/national compositions and with no 
significant conflicts over their minorities with neighboring countries (see 
Bugajski 1994; Juhasz 1996; Nagy 1995; Sidjanski 1997; on Hungary's 
implementation of the European Union’s legal framework for dealing with 
ethnic minorities, see Nagy 1997; also Fullerton, Sik, and Toth 1995, 1997).
Another, more recent development in postcommunist East Central 
Europe has had undemocratic repercussions on that region's residents national 
self/others perceptions and intergroup relations, namely, the growing influx 
into those countries of (transit and permanent) immigrants and refugees from 
non-European parts of the former Soviet Union, Asia, and Africa. The numbers 
of these new arrivals have thus far been limited (excluding illegal worker- 
tourists and repatriate nationals from CIS, in 1993 about 10,000 [im]migrants 




























































































Hungary; the latter has also received considerably larger inflows of Romanian 
and Yugoslav refugees). But the appearance of these "visible aliens" on the 
streets—a new sight to the natives— combined with depictions of refugee camps 
in the media and discussions about the necessity to feed and house their 
residents from taxpayers' monies according to international agreements, have 
evoked common expressions of antipathy toward and occasional overt 
aggression against those newcomers reported in all three ECE countries (see 
Jasiewicz 1995; Hars 1997; Frejka 1996; Maresova 1996; Juhasz 1996; Okolski 
1996a; Toth 1995; Trends in International Migrations/SOPEMI 1996: Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary; Fullerton, Sik, and Toth 1997; Slany 1997; 
Nowicka 1997; Romaniszyn 1997).12
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the consolidation of democracy "from 
below," that is, with and through the active support of rank-and-file citizens of 
postocmmunist ECE societies has been a syndrome of habituated popular 
outlooks and practices that during the communist period served as effective 
"survival strategies" and have endured to the present or even partially 
intensified. In particular, three such related elements of this homo sovieticus 
syndrome or the accustomed resources for coping with the previous system that 
are now a hindrance to the construction of a functional democratic order have 
been a popular distrust of public institutions, especially the state, its organs, and 
functionaries combined with widespread civic apathy ("enemies" of the 
consolidation of democracy elements 1/1, 11/6, and III/9a in table 1), and the 
pervasive corruption that has made "beating the system" and "going around the 
law" into widely accepted social norms (hindrance to elements 1/4 and III/10 
and 12). Whereas the anti-state orientation in Poland has had the longest 
precommunist history and the broadest social reach during the communist era, 
the remaining two features seem to have been similarly widely and deeply 
embedded in all three ECE countries (see Tismanyanu 1992; Schopflin 1996).
After a short period of popular mobilization during the transition from 
communist to democratic regimes in East Central Europe, the deep-rooted 
habits/legacy of communist rule combined with the hardships of economic 
transformation that have affected large segments of the population in the region 
have again (re)produced widespread civic anomie or cynicism toward 
government and its representatives, which are again perceived as "them" 
(versus "us," rank-and-file citizens) and mass withdrawal from politcal 
involvement-two closely affiliated phenomena familiar from the communist 
era which Kenneth Jowitt (1992) has called "dissimulation," or the retraction of 
people from the official sphere into private circles (see also Schopflin 1995; 
Tismanyanu 1992; Rose 1996).
Social surveys conducted in Poland and Hungary in 1993-94, barely a 
half decade after the installment there of democratic regimes, show the vast 
majority (more than 70%) of young citizens, also the highly educated ones-the 
"future of democracy" in these societies—reporting lack of interest in politics 
and public matters generally. About three-quarters believe their influence on 




























































































interested in gaining or retaining power than in the good of the country 
(Roberts and Jung 1995; Simon 1993; CBOS November 1997, March 1998; 
Jasiewicz 1995; see also Lewis 1993; Szelenyi, Szelenyi, and Poster 1996; 
Connor and Ploszajski 1992; Kolarska-Bobinska 1998). In comparison, perhaps 
because of the presence of very popular and charismatic leaders in top political 
positions in their country, even though their voting participation has been 
systematically diminishing since 1992, the Czechs in 1994 scored considerably 
higher than their two ECE neighbors on "trust in the government": more than 
50% of affirmative answers compared to a little more than 20% in Poland and 
Hungary each. (In the wake of the corruption scandal involving prime minister 
Klaus in 1997, however, those ratings dropped rapidly to a level approaching 
Polish and Hungarian scores; see Rose and Haerpfer 1994, tables 23, 52, 58; 
Krejci and Machonin 1996; Palous 1995; Toka 1995.)13
Another enduring component of the homo sovieticus syndrome that has 
been a significant obstacle for the stabilization of the rule of democratic law in 
public affairs and social life and the emergence of a functional economic 
society as the guarantor of the material base for carrying out by the state of its 
collective good functions has been widespread corruption and nepotism.14 
Ubiquitous under communist rule, this "privatization of the public sphere" (as 
the other side of the politicization of the private realm characteristic of that 
command-and-control system) has persisted into(G:?) the new era sustained by 
the embedded popular orientation-cum-practice of "working the system" and 
meaning, informed by the basic distrust of the official institutional structures, 
the reliance on informal connections and using roundabout or outright 
illegitimate means perceived as the best or only way toward one's purposes. 
(On corruption and nepotism in the communist system see Gittelman 1984; 
Wedel 1986; Los 1990; Jowitt 1992; in postocommunist Eastern and Central 
Europe see Kharkhordin 1994; Gubin and Kostiouchenko 1997; Krejci a 
Machonin 1996; Sik 1994a, 1994b, 1994c; Szara Gospodarka w Polsce 1996; 
Frieske 1997; Okolski 1996b).
Current losses to the state treasury in each of East Central European 
countries from unreported earnings in home or Western informal economies 
and unpaid or falsified taxes have been estimated at billions of dollars annually 
(Sik 1994a, 1994b, 1994c; Okolski 1996b; Witkowski 1995; Grabowski 1994; 
this disrespect for the law and the ensuing losses to the state are even much 
greater in the eastemmore nation-states-former Soviet Republics—see, e.g., 
Handelman 1995; Konstantinov 1997; Dawisha and Parrott 1997).
Reinforcing the enduring homo sovieticus effects, the combination of 
economic deprivations accompanying post-1989/90 capitalist transformation 
(an avergage of more than one-third of the employed population in East Central 
European countries combined had lived below the poverty level and another 
one-third experienced difficulties in making ends meet in 1995, while 
unemployment caused by the economic restructuring ranged, depending on the 
region, between 20% to 50%-Berend 1995; for ECE national data see Frejka 




























































































without prior public discussion and consultations with the affected groups) 
regarding taxes, private property and investments have acted as an impediment 
to the active interest in and involvement on behalf of the consolidation of 
democracy of ECE populations.
The ECE migrants' experience during their sojourns in the West not only 
does not teach them, as was the case with their predecessors one century ago, 
democratic habits and does not modify the undemocratic ones they are 
accustomed to but, to the contrary, enhances some of the latter either by making 
them useful for migrants' purposes or through the "demonstration effect," that 
is, by showing the Western ways as not much different from the orientations 
and practices prevalent in migrants' home countries. The major reasons for this 
situation have been the following.
The overall politicization of contemporary international migrations has 
made the determination of who can enter, how long they can stay, what 
activities they can undertake, intricately entangled in politics and ideology that 
are negotiated at the national and international "upper structures" well above 
the heads of the migrant subjects of these decisions (see Zolberg 1983; 
Goodwin-Gill 1993; Esman 1992; Hollifield 1996; Cornelius, Martin, and 
Hollifield 1994; Weiner 1995; Sassen 1996; Richmond 1994). In comparison, 
at the turn of the twentieth century the decisions of whether, where, and for 
how long to go were by and large the prerogative of the migrants themselves, 
their families, and local communities. Contemporary ECE (and other outside 
of highly developed world core) migrants' subjection to receiver-country 
immigration policy limitations on stay duration and prohibition of work without 
a special permit has created in Western destination countries a large army of 
marginalized "illegal" migrants.
A profound economic restructuring of highly developed Western 
societies (and with them of the global economy) triggered by the international 
oil crisis of 1973 and the severe industrial downturn afterward has comprised 
two processes of direct consequence for the position of most of the East Central 
European migrants in these countries. Transformation from an industrial to a 
high-tech, services-driven economy has been accompanied by a shift to short­
term, flexible production based on small, versatile companies. Related to the 
above has been a rapid growth of the informal ("third") economic sector 
offering variable, usually substandard, wages and no employment security, 
largely "detached" from mainstream advancement/ integration opportunities 
and from the legal-institutional structures of the fiscal and welfare systems. (On 
the emergence of the postindustrial economy and its major features see, e.g., 
Sassen 1991; Postman 1992; Castells 1996; cf. also Harvey 1990).
Migrants involved in Arbeitstourismus or Handelstourismus make up the 
largest two categories among post-1989/90 East Central European travelers to 
the West. Whereas their predecessors one century ago found themselves at the 
lowest echelons but within mainstream political and economic structures of the 




























































































ideas and practices, contemporary migrants' position as indocumentado 
informal-sector workers or "gray" or "black" market cross-border traders 
marginalizes and largely isolates them from everyday contacts with host- 
country mainstream institutions and its representatives. (On migrants' isolation 
from mainstream host societies see Siewiera 1995; Cyrus 1995, 1995a; Misiak 
1995; Mydel and Fassmann 1997).
Contacts that exist are limited. For migrants engaged in illegal work, they 
involve personalized and subordinate relations with their native patrons or 
employers, occasionally with native workers whose employment conditions and 
living standards are glaringly better than their own, and, if unlucky, with 
immigration officers combing foreign neighborhoods and work sites for 
indocumentados like themselves. Cross-border traders engage in under-the- 
counter exchanges with the byuers or sellers of their merchandise and 
unpleasant encounters with customs officers. Neither of these contacts are 
amenable to learning the principles and operation of a democratic society 
(elements II/6 and 7 in table 1) and culture (III/10, 11 and 12). Actually, 
Western postindustrial employers' semiopen search for cheap informal foreign 
workers and the eagerness of "mini-transnational" business enterprises to deal 
in contraband merchandise16 sustain or even reinforce (because of the much 
greater remuneration it brings than at home) in ECE migrants their accustomed 
undemocratic beat-the-system/circumvent-the-law orientations of communist 
provenance that they find profitable in the West. The returnees then reimplant— 
Poles on the largest scale as the most numerous among ECE Arbeits- and 
Handelstouristen—this "renergized" undemocratic orientation-cum-practice into 
their home country economic societies.
In yet another way migrants' Western experience contributes to the 
reinforcement rather than modification of the preconceptions they bring with 
them from their homecountries. Long since gone among the dominant 
sociocultural strata of Western societies is the "spirit of Progressive Reform" 
(or its contemporary European social- and Christian-democratic equivalents) 
that led members of tum-of-the-twentieth-century elites to immigrant 
neighborhoods to educate their residents in the practical rights and duties of 
citizenship. Today, moral philosophers and social scientists alike deplore the 
failing standards of Western democracies reflected in widespread cynicism 
regarding the once sacrosanct principles of the "democratic creed," political 
distrust and disillusionment, and the dwindling of civic participation, which 
have fallen victim to privatization and "consumerization" of citizens' interests 
and pursuits (see, e.g., Laski 1969; Koechler 1987; Entman 1989; Harvey 1989; 
Postman 1992; Boggs 1997; Kaase and Newton 1995).
The media, and especially the tv deluged by Western advertisements and 
entertainment programs watched avidly by East Central Europans at home since 
the fall of communism and the subsequent spread of cable networks and during 
their sojourns in the West project these images convincingly enough. But the 
"good works" of democracy are scarcely represented, at least not in a way 




























































































the intricacies of Western politics (in this matter tum-of-the-century 
Progressive Reformer civics classes for (im)migrants did a much better job). 
These representations do not correct but confirm migrants' accustomed 
concepts of democracy as, basically, the freedom to mind one's own business 
and to enjoy ever-proliferating consumer goods. So enhanced by Western 
experience, the "democratic attitudes" commonly displayed in today's East 
Central Europe among successful returned migrants express, according to one 
observer, the conviction that "what is important is not that the roads (in their 
countries) are in a bad state, but the fact that (they) drive on them in (their) 
Mercedeses" (after Abner 1997, 83).
Two more factors in the situation of contemporary ECE migrants during 
their Western sojourns diminish their opportunities to become acquainted with 
the (good) works of democracy and sustain instead their home-bred orientations 
and behavioral habits: the short-term, back-and-forth or pendel (shuttling) 
nature of their international travels, and their accustomed reluctance to organize 
themselves. In both these aspects present-day migrants differ from their tum-of- 
the-century predecessors.
The average duration of tum-of-the-twentieth-century nonpermanent 
ECE migrants’ sojourns in America (the historical comparison used here) was 
three to five years. Visits of their contemporary successors, destined mostly for 
neighboring Western countries and constrained by time limitations imposed by 
receiver countries' immigration policies on the one hand, and, on the other, by 
the greater availability of flexible short-term rather than long-term jobs in 
Western postindustrial economies, have been of a much shorter duration, 
ranging from a couple of days (traders) to a few months to one year (illegal 
workers). A significantly increased presence of women among migrants (they 
average about 40% of the total as compared with 25% century ago), many of 
whom are married and have underage children at home, also shortens durations 
of work abroad.
In this situation contemporary migrants' lives during their sojourns 
abroad remain immersed, actually and symbolically, in their home-country 
habitats, outlooks, and concerns. Considering that the primary purpose of their 
travels is the improvement of the material standards and social status of their 
families and that because of their manifoldly insecure position while abroad 
this purpose is chronically endangered and requires alert "defensive attention," 
not much space is left in the existence of the typical migrants in the categories 
considered here to become acquainted with and to absorb new democratic ideas 
and practices.
Finally, contemporary ECE migrants' reluctance to organize themselves— 
a communist legacy of "dissimulation" or noninvolvement resulting from a 
generalized distrust of state/public institutions transplanted to the West—may be 
understandable. Undocumented worker migrants prefer to keep a low profile 
for fear of being deported. (This attitude, however, has been displayed also by 




























































































opportunities to acquire know-how of the workings of civil society, but. 
importantly, cuts them off from host country institutional sources of legal 
advice and, if necessary, defense, when they are abused by employers and in 
dealing with immigration bureaus, and police departments, as well as umbrella 
organizations (such as, e.g., the European Union Migrants' Forum [EUMF]) 
that represent migrant associations in national and international political 
forums. (On present-day ECE migrants as "invisible communities" and Western 
national and international associations that perform consultatory and 
representational functions for contemporary organized migrant groups, see 
Fijakowski 1994; Mydel and Fassmann 1997; Misiak 1995; Siewiera 1995; 
Cyrus 1997; Danese 1998; Marks and McAdam 1996; Kastoryano 1994).
Business and "Brain Exchange" Re-/Expatriates and Democratization in 
ECE
Although Arbeits- and Handelstouristen clearly predominate among present- 
day ECE cross-border migrants, the depiction here would be incomplete and the 
evaluation of the exiguous or outright negative impact of westbound migrations 
on the consolidation of democracy in East Central Europe exceedingly 
foreclosing without a consideration of the emergence of new kinds of 
international travelers or, better, milieus to emphasize professional connections 
and informal or "weak social ties" (Granovetter 1985) among their members, 
whose activities directly or indirectly contribute to the the building of 
functional democracies in that region. Although admittedly a wishful thinking, 
I call these new kinds of travelers harbingers of democratic role models among 
international migrants who with (considerable) time might, if not replace the 
now prevalent types, at least overcome or neutralize their contrary effects 
through repercussions from their "good works."
These new international migrants can be classified into four categories;
(1) a minority of Handels- and Arbeitstouristen who become owners of small- 
to-middle-level enterprises;
(2) highly skilled ECE migrants, including business executives, managers, and 
scientists who make regular professional trips to the West (or around the 
world);
(3) repatriated or, more often, "shuttling" between the countries of their present 
and native residences highly skilled ECE emigres from the postwar (1945 to 
1989/90) period; and
(4) "expat" (from expatriate) Western specialists, consultants, managers of 
international companies, researchers, and the like who go to East Central 
Europe for shorter or longer sojourns for professional purposes or, in the case 
of emissaries of various EU and related NGO bodies, to monitor the 
preparations for the pending incorporation of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 




























































































Although the (legitimate) business and professional activities they pursue 
and their secure economic and legal-political positions both in the sending and 
the receiving societies make migrants in all four categories into "natural allies" 
of the democratic order, their different social-institutional locations, life 
experiences, and habits and the particular focuses and purposes of their 
activities differently problematize their relationship with democratization 
processes in East Central Europe.
Ten to 15 percent of ECE tourist-workers and tourist-traders, almost 
exclusively men, invest the monies they earn in the West to fund their own 
businesses, often (registered) joint ventures with Western partners, in their local 
communities. They thus acquire legal status and move into the formal sector of 
the economy, actually, one of its transformation-driving segments whose 
growth postcommunist governments view as an important measure of their 
political success. For these fledgling businesses to put down firmer roots and, 
once established, to prosper, a consolidated, stable legal-institutional 
democratic environment is needed, and, especially (see table 1), components 1/3 
and 5 in the juridico-political arena, 11/6 in the social sphere, and III/8 and 9 in 
the civic culture domain. The limited evidence that exists thus far on the 
attitudes and behaviors of such international migrants-tumed-businessmen 
suggests that they support the consolidation of democracy not only in their 
home countries at large but also, importantly, in their local communities (see, 
e.g., Cieslinska 1997, and her personal communication to this author, 28 
February, 1998; Misiak 1995, and his personal communication to this author, 3 
March, 1998; Morawska [study in progress]).
A potential danger for functional democracy losing the support of this 
emerging group, lies in the possibility that they may opt for greater risk but 
much larger revenues from illegal big business, especially with (eager) partners 
in more eastern parts of East Europe where, particularly in politically and 
economically unstable Russia, criminal enterpreneurship is very common (see, 
e.g., Ulrich 1994; Brief on Crime and Corruption in Russia 1994). The slower 
the democratic consolidation in the upper layers of the ECE political and 
economic societies, the greater is the likelihood that, if such smaller-to-middle 
local establishments survive at all, they will move into that avenue. Conversely, 
although with a more gradual impact, the more and more vocal such local-level 
supporters of democracy among new businessmen, including international 
migrants are, the greater is the chance that the upper-state echelons will 
progress toward the solidification of a democratic order.
Highly skilled international travelers, the second group considered here, 
by the mid-1990s constituted about 12%-14% of the total number of post 
1989/90 temporary westbound migrants (excluding "pure" tourists) from each 
of the three ECE countries (estimates compiled from Berencsi and Sik 1995; 
Juhasz 1996; Cermak 1997, Uhlirova 1997; Slany 1997). These are 
predominantly managers of successful private (as opposed to socialist state- 
owned) businesses, service and production centers, including those owned 




























































































increasing numbers of highly skilled native ECEs competent in foreign 
languages, scientists and researchers, including graduate and postgraduate 
students on Western fellowships (see Hottbrugge 1994; Redor 1994; Redei 
1995; Hillmann and Rudolph 1997; Cermak 1997; Rudolph 1997).
The sociodemographic profile of these migrants—their young age (most 
are under 35), graduate or postgraduate education, professional occupation, and 
residence in large urban centers—locates them in the category that recent social 
surveys of changes in self/other perceptions and life-orientations in 
postcommunist societies in East Europe find better informed than others about 
public matters, most likely to identify with such democratic values as the 
universalist-inclusive bases of civic-political participation (element II/7 in table 
1) as opposed to exclusive-particularist nationalism, and most decisively 
supporting governance of public institutions by democratic rules (1/1-5, I1I/9, 
11 and 12) (see Meyer 1993; Liebich and Warner 1995; Ingelhart 1996; Slany 
1997). Highly skilled migrants' professional activities and their participation, 
on a partnership (most commonly, junior partnership) basis, in the international 
institutional and social networks informed by democratic practices enhance 
these orientations and provide a "training ground" to turn preferences into 
habitual behavioral patterns.
One actual and two potential problems exist regarding the impact of 
these highly skilled ECE migrants on the consolidation of democracy in their 
home countries. Very considerable during the communist era, since the early 
1990s the "brain drain" emigration from that region has significantly 
diminished. It nevertheless continues, depleting especially members of the 
youngest cohorts among highly skilled international migrants, namely graduate 
and postgraduate students, who leave on Western fellowships and upon 
graduation there search for—and often find—jobs in the West that offer greater 
professional opportunities and much higher salaries than those available at 
home (see Hryniewicz, Jalowiecki and Mync 1994; Drbohlav 1996; Juhasz 
1996; Cermak 1997; Slany 1997). A similar reciprocal relationship to that 
noted regarding Handels- and Arbeitstouristen turned into modem capitalist 
businessmen (as different from protocapitalist or bazaar-type petty 
entrepreneurs) obtains here as well. The quicker and more effective the 
democratic consolidation in East Central Europe is as the base of economic 
growth and, especially in this case, the stabilization of the distributive functions 
of the state (element 1/4 in table 1; here-support for science and research), the 
more likely its highly skilled international migrants will return to their ECE 
native countries. And, in turn, the larger the number of such migrants making 
their native countries the permanent or semipermanent bases of their 
professional activities, the greater the chance for the successful consolidation of 
democracy there.
Two potential problems exist. First, transnational professional activities 
and institutional networks, and, increasingly, also lifestyles of highly skilled 
international travelers locate them already in what Robert Dahl (1989) has 




























































































evolves from lower-level historical democratic formations, the (premodem) 
local community and the (modem) nation-state. East Europe has already had an 
unfortunate experience with "jumping stages" (the Marxian "iron model" of 
historical development wherein communism was to issue from mature 
capitalism but not from the post-feudal/proto-capitalist socioeconomic order). 
Could this work this time? Could local- and national-level democracy develop 
"from above" or from a global democratic order? There are, of course, no ready 
answers to these questions, except, perhaps, the acknowledgment that the 
greatly increased interconnectedness of different parts and "levels" may 
facilitate such a development to an extent unprecedented in the past (on global 
democratization, provided the growth of structural interconnected- ness is 
accompanied by purposeful focused effort by human actors, see Walzer 1995).
Second, on a lower plane, highly skilled ECE migrants' normative and 
practical "involvement with democracy" through their professional activities is 
by and large limited to its procedural aspects, leaving out the participatory 
dimension (elements 11/6 and III/9a in table 1). Specialists on democratic 
transformations agree that a lively civil society whose members support not 
only the negative freedom from oppression and unnecessary control by the state 
but also the positive freedom actively to participate in public affairs to 
contribute to the common good is a sine qua non condition for the successful 
consolidation of democracy. This orientation-cum-practice is very much 
missing in postcommunist ECE societies where civic apathy is widespread. In 
this context, altghough not surprising in view of their institutional affiliations 
and professional purposes, the nearly exclusive emphasis on procedural 
democracy and the neglect of its participatory dimension in the experience of 
highly skilled ECE international migrants appears overly restricted in regard to 
the broader-scope needs of their societies as they build whole new democratic 
orders.
More concerned with civic participation as an aspect-condition of 
democratization has been another, smaller group of present-day highly skilled 
ECE international migrants, namely, the humanistic intelligentsia: writers, 
philosophers, historians, teachers, and public officials, including those-the 
group I focus on here—who had been involved in the oppositional "parallel 
society" under communist rule. The underlying idea or the spiritus movens of 
that dissident civil society was, in the words of Bronislaw Geremek, a historian 
and leading Solidarity activist in Poland, "the refusal to participate in 
falsehood" (Geremek 1996, 247; see also Konrad 1984; Havel 1985) 
represented by the official public sphere. Opting for "ethical anti-politics" as 
the way to oppose—and mentally and morally overcome by living "as if we 
were free" (Michnik 1985)—the communist system, these oppositional elites 
shared with popular opinion the implicit equation of the removal of that 
despised regime with the advent of democracy and national liberation and the 
taken-for-granted assumption that these two desired developments were 
integral to each other. The contradictions inherent in these presuppositions and, 
specifically, between a pluralist-democratic vision of the state and (never 




























































































hand, and, on the other, the "undemocratic antitotalitarianism" premised on the 
polarizing opposition of us-society/ethical and them-state/evil forces mirroring 
a rebours communist attitudes had largely gone unnoticed in political and 
philosophical discourses in ECE parallel society circles.
Unless they had emigrated earlier (see below), since the collapse of 
Soviet-controlled regimes in East Central Europe several members of this 
dissident intelligentsia have assumed political or other public functions either 
in national or international bodies, and in this capacity they now frequently 
travel abroad; others do the same as university lecturers, researchers, and 
publishers. Their now direct experience with the budding democracies in their 
home countries and with the malaise of the mature ones in the West has 
unavoidably made them aware of the aforementioned contradictions and the 
urgent need to revive the civil society and to reconcile it with the political one 
(the state) so that one can stimulate the other. They have been debating these 
issues not only in domestic forums, but also in international meetings and 
conferences on democratic transition/consolidation in postcommunist East 
Europe and in Western publications (see, e.g., Fullerton, Sik, and Toth 1995, 
1997; Nagy 1997a; Szabo 1997; Csepeli and Sik 1995; Krol 1996; Geremek 
1996; Palous 1995; Marody 1993; Svatek 1993).
A possible problem here is that the successful establishment of 
procedural democracy and the putting down roots of consumer capitalism 
accompanied by "status restructuring" of ECE societies will likely undermine— 
the signs are already present—the moral prestige and cultural impact those 
humanistic elites had traditionally had in the region, even among reluctant 
communist rulers. As East Central Europe "normalizes" according to Western 
liberal-democratic prescriptions, it may well happen that the voices of this 
intelligentsia on behalf of the encompassing, particpatory democracy for 
common good will not be heard anymore.
Returned and, more commonly, half-returned ECE emigres from the 
communist era are the third category of higly skilled international migrants 
whose professional activities contribute to the consolidation of democracy in 
that region. A total of more than 3 million citizens of Poland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia combined (Poles making up more than a half of that number) 
either stayed on in the West as so-called displaced persons (DPs) after the 
conclusion of World War II and the imposition of communist rule in East 
Central Europe or left during the fifty years it endured. The proportion of 
college-educated professionals among those emigres (with no significant 
between-country differences) has been a high 25%-30% (estimates, excluding 
German Aussiedlers, compiled from Okolski 1996a, 1996b; Juhasz 1996; 
Maresova 1996; Krejci and Mahonin 1996; Korcelli 1994; Dovenyi and 
Vukovich 1994; Slany 1995). Since 1989-90, encouraged by postcommunist 
governments in their native countries eager to establish links with potential 
political allies to help negotiate reintegration with the Western world and hoped 
for investors in the transforming ECE economies, considerable numbers of 




























































































countries on professional longer sojourns —mid-1990s estimates of these two 
categories combined range from 10,000-15,000 for the Czech Republic to 
20,000-25,000 for Poland and Hungary eachl8-or, in much larger numbers, 
visit there regularly on business.
These repatriates, either self-employed or working for international 
organizations—most commonly OECD, GATT, IMF, World Bank, UN 
Development Program, PHARE Foundation, Ford Foundation, American 
Agency for International Development, and different NGOs, or for ECE 
government bodies, hold multiple residence cards citizenships and 
memberships in professional organizations in several countries and represent a 
wide variety of specialists from investors of capital or (co)owners of production 
and service establishments, financial consultants, privatization experts, 
specialists, consultants and teachers of the market economy and effective 
management to international lawyers, political scientists, and organizational 
sociologists (see Pridham and Vanhanen 1994; Kennedy and Gianoplus 1994; 
Juhasz 1996, Hillmann and Rudolph 1997; Misiak 1995, and his personal 
communication to this author, 3 March, 1998; Okolski 1996b; Kruszewski 
1998; Morawska [study in progress]; Cermak 1997).
Their professional expertise in the matters they concern themselves with 
while in East Central Europe and simultaneous involvement with Western 
(sending) companies and organizations and with ECE (receiver) institutions 
and people allow those specialists to demonstrate and teach the latter "hands 
on" the rules and procedures of functional democracy in their respective 
economic and political societies. They teach, especially, the art of "democratic 
craftsmanship" or the deliberative-negotiatory methods of solving conflicts and 
formulating consenus and respect for democratically implemented laws and 
policies of public institutions even if they are disliked (elements 1/5 and III/l 1 
and 12 in table 1). Importantly, because, unlike representatives of the second 
category of international migrants whose democratizing professional activities 
concentrate predominantly in the few largest urban centers in each of the 
countries considered here, a number of highly skilled re/emigrants involve 
themselves as well in provincial centers and small communities (Morawska 
[study in progress]; Misiak 1995, and personal communication to this author, 3 
March, 1998; Goldyka 1997; Cieslinska 1997, and personal communication to 
this author, 1 March, 1998) so that the transformative and demonstration effects 
of their pursuits have a broader social reach.
One of the limitations of these effects has been, again, derived from the 
focus and purposes of the activities involved their almost exclusively 
procedural character. Another is the undemocratic (in the new circumstances) 
impact of the "diaspora legacy" imported by some reemigre activists, especially 
those engaged in the political arena, and, specifically, the "totalizing 
antitotalitarianism," on the one hand, and, on the other, belligerent nationalism. 
Both of these attitudes have also been part of the popular outlooks in the native 
countries of recent reemigrants, but the latter's diaspora condition has 




























































































There is no question that the intransingent antitotalitarianism of ECE 
political emigres supported, politically and financially, by the U.S.-led Western 
world because of its cold war era strategic interests in the containment of Soviet 
communism helped to erode authoritarian regimes and to pluralize ideas and 
information in their homelands in several ways: by challenging the former's 
domestic and international legitimacy, by supporting the domestic political 
opposition and contesting the regimes' attempts to suppress it, by exposing 
human rights violations in their home countries, and by making available 
uncensored information there that was competitive to Soviet-style newspeak.'Q 
But the uncompromising calls by some of those reemigres for the radical 
"decommunization" of the political, cultural, and even economic societies in 
post-1989/90 East Central Europe has been an obstruction rather than a 
facilitation of the democratization processes in that region, especially 
consolidation of the elements 1/1, 2 and 5, II/7, and III/9a, 11 and 12 (see table 
1). Thus far it has been primarily domestic former dissidents who participate in 
the above-mentioned "reassessment debate" on the need of a new alliance 
between the society and the democratic state and the art of the compromise as a 
constitutive component of functional democracy.20
Another such obstruction (and for the same elements) has been an 
intolerant, aggressive nationalism displayed in public arenas by some of the 
returnees, especially from the older, DP wave of emigration, and more among 
Poles and Hungarians than among Czechs. Highly "cultured" in the history and 
traditions of their countries, postwar political emigres from Soviet-dominated 
East Europe profoundly identified, as self-proclaimed nationalists or in an 
unreflexive manner, with their Vaterlands’ national orientations and collective 
representations shaped during the nineteenth century and informed, as noted 
earlier, by ethno-particularistic principles of membership and contradictory 
us/them valuations. Because of the enduring resentment on the part of many 
exiles of having been forced to abandon their homelands coerced into a new, 
this time political, subjection to Soviet rule, postwar emigres-those "pillars of 
fire," as Matthew Jacobson (1995) has called them- readily incorporated this 
old (Russia)/new (USSR) archenemy of East European nationhoods and civil 
liberties into their national sagas of "ancient struggles" between these 
oppressed nations and their enemies. (On postwar East European exiles' 
romantic ethnonationalism see Jacobson 1995; Jusdanis 1991; Rubchak 1993, 
1993; Bakula 1997; Orlowski 1997; also Safran 1991; Shain 1993.)
Rather than extinguishing with the regaining of national sovereignty by 
East Central European societies in 1989-90, some of those "pillars of fire" 
flared up, either triumphantly or on an "defensive-offensive" alert for enemies 
lurking inside and outside national borders. Although much less common 
among reemigrants and less influential in public affairs than, for example, in 
postcommunist Slovakia or Ukraine,21 such voices of nationalist triumph or, 
alternately, paranoia coming from recent repatriates can also be heard in East 
Central Europe. Should they find responsive echoes in popular-level 
resentments (e.g., among Hungarians unhappy with the ways EU laws, soon-to- 




























































































informed by such orientations could interfere with the progress of 
democratization in these countries.
The last group to be considered are highly skilled Western expatriates 
who come to East Central Europe in business and professional capacities 
similar, although usually in higher positions within their organizations, to those 
of the majority of ECE reemigrants. This is a quickly growing population: the 
1995 estimates of college-educated longer-term work permit holders of non- 
ECE backgrounds from Western Europe and North America were more than 
double the figures three years prior or about 25,000 to 30,000 in each of the 
three countries included in this analysis. The numbers of short-term Western 
business visitors have been much larger. The average age of these expatriate 
migrant experts in East Central Europe is 40-45, and the largest proportions of 
them are from Germany, the United States, Austria, Great Britain, and France.2'
The kinds of "hard" and "soft" skills, including attitudes and practices 
conributing to the consolidation of democratic organization and culture, that 
Western professional migrants bring to the ECE institutions they work in or 
with have already been noted in the discussion of highly trained reemigrants 
and, preceding this, the emerging stratum of ECE business and professional 
globetrotters, many of whom actually work under the supervision of Western 
expert expats. A few studies exist of the relations of the latter with their ECE 
work force and their opinions of its strengths and weaknesses (Wilk 1997; 
Murdoch 1996; Hillmann and Rudolph 1997; Kennedy and Gianoplus 1994; 
see also Redei 1995). The major strengths of ECE employees of these foreign 
firms and organizations in the eyes of their Western employers are their solid 
professional qualifications and their "enthusiasm" for the work they do. The 
most typical shortcomings noted by Western employers in each of the three 
countries considered here, which suggests their common source in legacies of 
ancient-regime outlooks and habits, are lack of organizational skills and, 
especially, the ability to delegate and share tasks and responsibilities, 
inflexibility in making and negotiating decisions, and accountability, that is, the 
assumption and execution of responsibility for one's own and group 
performance. As the interviewed expats emphasized, however, most of the 
young and eager ECE employees of these establishments are quick to learn and 
many have already successfully adapted to Western work and organizational 
practices.23
As these observations indicate, ECE employees of Westem/intematonal 
firms and organizations learn on the job not only the known-how of democratic 
procedures, but also elements of political culture (III/11 and 12 in table 1) as 
well as active responsibility for "the whole" (III/9a), in this case, the employer- 
institution. Because the loyalty to and identification with the firm are very 
strongly and, apparently, effectively emphasized -young ECE employees 
interviewed for the above studies, while talking about their jobs readily referred 
to being "part of the big family" whose success they testify to by their "entire 
person's" body and mind (Wilk 1997, 8)—it may be that rather than extending 




























































































remain fragmentarily focused in this obviously important but narrow arena.
Two other potential problems related to the proliferation in ECE of 
Westem/multinational companies (less so international organization- 
emmisaries of the OECD, UN and other political and economic development 
agencies, and health, educational, environment protection, and NGOs) and the 
effects thereof should be noted. While discussing the native ECE highly skilled 
international travelers I pointed out that the effects of the training for practical 
democracy by Westem/multinational companies are largely limited to the 
emerging globally connected elites in the restructuring ECE societies and do 
not penetrate the larger segments of their populations. 1 also suggested that the 
rapidly "densifying" interconnectedness between different parts of the world 
and its different-level structures may facilitate the gradual trickling down of 
democratic ideas and practices from the global to the regional- and local-level 
environments. I raise here again the issue of these top-down divisions, this time 
more pessimistically.
The soon-to-be decade of experience with capitalist democracy in-the- 
making has signficantly undermined its popular representation in East Central 
Europe representation as the paradise system of economic affluence for all. The 
velvet-revolution period of 1989-90 when "us" meant the united people and 
"them" the collapsing communist regime and its nomenklatura functionaries has 
long since given way to the perceptions of "us" as ordinary, struggling citizens 
versus "them" comprising new political and economic elites. ECE employees of 
international firms, clad in quality Western suits, paid four to eight times more 
than average local wages, and traveling around the world are viewed as the 
integral part of these new them-elites. Could it happen that the training for and 
incorporation of top skilled ECEs into world elite global commuters rather than 
broadening the base for the trickle down of democratic patterns to their 
societies at large, contribute instead to the expansion into that region of the 
familiar in highly developed postindustrial societies, hardening the division 
between super- (educated, earning, and interconnected) and underclasses?
Should development in this direction actually take place, it could be 
more complicated yet. Highly skilled ECE employees of Western and 
multinational companies-powerful lucky Krezuses in the eyes of their fellow 
nationals—usually occupy lower-level positions on the internal prestige ladders 
of their firms, earn two-to-three times less,24 and have lower ceilings on their 
promotion opportunities than is the case with their Western coworkers who are 
performing commesurable jobs (see Hillmann and Rudolph 1997; Hottbrugge 
1994; Reide 1995; Wilk 1997). The ECE employees themselves tell also about 
their Western coworkers "living in their own [social] world" in different 
(better) neighborhoods and bigger houses, attending different (better) 
restaurants, exclusive clubs, and vacation places, not so much because of the 
differences in their views and preferences, but in the "contents of their wallets" 
(Wilk 1997, 5-6). This situation may well be temporary and with the passage 
of time, as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic join the European Union 




























































































prospects of talented natives of that region may well reach parity with those of 
their Western peers. But it may also not happen in which case East Central 
Europe together with its highly skilled international-firm employees would 
remain "poor partners" in the antechambers of world democratic capitalism 
dominated by its Western "core."25
Conclusion
The purpose of this discussion has been to initiate a conversation among the 
specialists on tum-of-the-twenty-first-century transnational migrations and 
democratization of postauthoritarian regimes. Both these processes have been 
entangled in and shaped by international contexts and events, and their 
conditioning factors and outcomes have partially overlapped. I have argued that 
the ways in which they are affliated have been far from straightforward, which 
should make the investigation of the relationship between contemporary 
transnational migrations and democratization processes more complex and 
interesting.
My examination of the impact of post-1989/90 international migrations 
of East Central Europeans (including Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians) on 
different arenas of democratic consolidation in that region produced two main 
conclusions. First, the vast majority of contemporary ECE migrants move to 
Western societies that have been the main source of ideas and practical models 
of democracy for postcommunist countries. Paradoxically, the contributions to 
democratization of this majority, or Handels- and Arbeitstouristen who 
constitute at present the bulk of westbound travelers (with Poles the most 
numerous among them) have been practically nonexistent. Their impact, if any, 
has been negative, that is, it has sustained rather than diminished the 
accustomed undemocratic ways in their home societies.
In explaining this phenomenon, I have identified the macro- and micro­
level factors in the sending (ECE) and receiving (WE/USA) environments of 
migration. I have discussed the characteristics, resulting therefrom, of the 
political, economic, and social position, and outlooks and purposes of those 
migrants during their sojourns abroad that, superimposed, have been 
unfavorable to a positive but often conducive to a negative influence of their 
Western experience on the consolidation of specific elements of the democratic 
societies and cultures at home. To bring into sharper relief the relationship 
between contemporary ECE migrations and the democratization processes in 
their home countries, I have set this discussion against a contrasting pattern of 
the migration-democracy connection that obtained one century ago during the 
period (1880s-1914) of mass rural migrations from East Central Europe to 
America.
Second, during the 1990s there has appeared a growing and 
heterogeneous group of highly skilled international travelers to-and-from East 




























































































professional "globetrotters," returned or regularly visiting members of ECE 
world diasporas, and Western expatriate economic and political experts. Their 
structural location in the sending and the receiving countries and their 
professional activities in East Central Europe allow them to contribute tangibly 
to the implantation of the "hard" and "soft" skills needed to operate democratic 
economic and political societies. Because of different past and present 
situations and different pursuits of (sub)group members, however, these 
contributions have had different focuses and, thus, also deficiencies.
In view of the importance for the successful consolidation of democracy 
of a broad social base and lively civil society, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the widespread persistence in postcommunist ECE societies of the 
ancien-regime legacy of civic apathy and "dissimulation," particularly 
regrettable has been the highly skilled migrants' nearly exclusive involvement 
with the procedural aspects of democracy to the neglect of its participatory 
dimension. With their primarily big-city, narrow-elite contacts they, therefore, 
influence and quickly transform the top echelons of the restructuring East 
Central European societies but barely, if at all penetrate into their larger 
segments.
More specifically focused investigations of the effects of international 
migrations on democratization processes in the tum-of-the-twenty-first-century 
world are obviously needed for a better-grounded assessment of this 
relationship. By showing that taking into account transnational migrations 
reveals the impact of the international contexts on democratic consolidation as 
much more problematic than some consolidologists have presented it, and that 
considering in migration studies the contributions of international movements 
to the progress (or the slowing) of this fundamental transformation makes the 
evaluations of these travels and their effects much more complex and more 
relevant to those involved with these democratization processes, this initial 
exercise has, hopefully, demonstrated the epistemic and possibly political gains 
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E n d n o te s
1. Cited after Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle 1995, 410,
2. The author's correspondence (January-March 1998) with Douglas Massey and Luis 
Guarnizo. Philippe Schmitter pointed out two reasons, both of the aperception-from-habit 
kind, for the neglect of international migration among political scientists-specialists on 
transition to/consolidation o f democracy. First, because the domestic and not international 
factors had played the decisive role in the earlier, South European and Latin American 
transitions to democratic regimes and it has only been recently, in the wake of Communisms 
collapse in East Europe, that the significance of international influences became evident to 
these scholars who have not yet completely "mastered" this newly perceived space. And 
second, because some studies conducted in the late 1960s-early 1970s on the impact of 
migrants-guest workers returing from Western Europe on the democratic processes in their 
home countries did not show any such significant effects and as the result the issue has lost 
interest (P.Schmitter's conversation with this author, March 3, 1998).
3. However, based on the analysis o f "looking for work" advertisments placed in Viennese 
papers by Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs between 1990 and 1992, the percentages of such in 
spe indocumentado migrants as reported by Fassmann, Kohlbacher, and Reeger (1996, 191) 
show Poles (26%) in the first place, but no significant difference between Czechs (11%) and 
Hungarians (15%).
I am not convinced by the explanations of the apparently greater "sedentariness" of the 
Hungarians in comparison with her ECE neighbors found in the literature of the subject (see, 
e.g., Morokvasic and de Tinguay 1992; Juhasz 1996), namely, that they are unsually "rooted" 
in heir Heimat (but so are Poles) or well-informed about the "realities o f  the West" (but the 
widely discrepant wage/salary ratio between East Central and Western Europe and 
opportunities to find "informal" work abroad are both well-known to economic migrants 
across the region). I would be inclined to look for an answer in more extensive and "user- 
habituated" support networks abroad relied on by migrating Poles, especially Arbeitstouristen. 
than reportedly by any other ECE group (see Slany 1997; Uhlirova 1997), but the issue clearly 
awaits further investigation.
4. The proportions o f female migrants shown in table 3 below (40% to 55%) represent the 
ratio for all present-day ECE migrants rather than just the worker- and trade-tourist categories 
combined.
5. For migrants' preferred destination countries and reasons thereof 1 have used raw data from 
this study provided by this author rather than those reported in the published book because of 
some apparent inconsistencies in the latter.
6. Considerable differences among the three ECE countries in terms of per capita GNP should 
be noted; in 1993 in the Czech Republic it was 42%, in Hungary 32%, and in Poland 28% of 
the average figure for Western Europe and North America combined. On East central 
Europe's economic performance in comparison with the Western world, from the turn of the 
twentieth century until the 1990s, see Berend and Ranki 1974, 1982; Berend 1996.




























































































order-to-motive by 9% of those planning permanent rather than temporary migration (after 
Berencsi and Sik 1995, 131).
8. In a recent study of migration from four Polish communities, over one-third of respondents 
replied to this question "I don't know" (Jazwinska and Okolski 1996, 195).
9. The rank-ordering, in terms of proportional numbers, o f turn-of-the-last-century travels to 
America by migrants' country of origin differed from that prevailing today in that the Czechs 
rather than the Hungarians had been the least represented; then as now, Poles were the most 
numerous.
10. Feudal serfdom was abolished in 1848 in the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy and 1861-64 
in Russia.
11. On these motives, see Morawska 1992; Jacobson 1995; Rubchak 1993.
12. The fragmentary data on the attitudies o f (native ECE) migrant versus non-migrant 
populations toward these new arrivals in their home countries have been contradictory: some 
studies (e.g., Jazwinska and Okolski 1996) show migrants as more prejudiced than their 
stationary fellow countrymen, while others (e.g., Cieslinska 1994; personal communication 
March 2, 1998) suggest that sojourns abroad actually reduce such prejudice. Until more 
systematic information is gathered on this issue it is impossible to evaluate the impact of 
international migration of attitude-holders on their perceptions of foreigners in their own 
country.
13. In explaining low voter turnout in democratic Hungary, Szelenyi, Szelenyi, and Poster 
(1996, after Simon 1994) point to the pre-communist tradition of little mass-level interest in 
politics considered uri huncutsag. a "gentleman's game” that ordinary citizens were not expect 
to understand and were not allowed to participate. This is an interesting hypothesis that would 
apply also to Poles, but not to the Czechs who, unlike these two ECE societies, never had 
such sharp division between the (large) gentry and peasant classes, but in the above 
discussions this proposition is asserted rather than demonstrated with actual evidence of such 
persistence and its mechanisms.
14. Some theories popular in the 1960s perceived corruption as useful for the development of 
the economically backward and politically over-bureaucratized countries because it enabled 
those with the "entrepreneurial spirit" to get around the "lacks" and "jams" in the existing 
infrastructures. As the situation in the underdevelopped countries over the last thirty years has 
demonstrated, however, rather than acting as an inducer of the increased wellbeing of their 
residents, pervasive corruption has contributed to the hardened division between the haves and 
havenots and widespread alientation of the latter. More recent interpretations (see, e.g., 
Diamond and Plattner 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996) view embedded corruption as destructive 
for the operational capacity and, thus, stability, of both the economic and political systems 
within particular countries and the entire regions.
15. If there was any, the entry selection on the part of the receiver societies was based on the 
arrivals' individual characteristics (e.g., their age, healthy appearance, or criminal record). A 
precursor of the forthcoming "etatization” of international migrations was the German 




























































































length of stay of the migrant sojourners, particularly those from eastern Europe. On the 
sending side, the Russian government imposed, too, (e)migration controls by witholding exit 
passports for the petitioners from ethnic-national groups or political milieus considered 
"untrustworthy." Regarding the relatively open immigration policies o f the receiving societies, 
especially the United States, it should be noted that throughout the entire period of turn-of- 
the-century mass immigration from South-Eastern Europe there continued there a heated 
public debate about the threats posed by those "culturally inferior" entrants and the means to 
control their influx until the latter was instituted in the 1920s--see John Higham 1975; Piktin 
1975; Kraut 1994; Weil 1997.
16. This information comes from my analysis o f the contents o f Polish- (and also Russian-) 
language press in Berlin, interviews with Polish border-control officers, and from personal 
communications of the authors o f press reportages on western and eastern Poland's border 
traffic.
17. Although the second and fourth categories of these new international migrants actually 
possessed their (quasi) parallels at the turn of the twentieth century in the form, respectively, 
of members o f ECE intelligentsia travelling to the West for education and professional 
apprenticeship, and Western manufacturers and investors coming to the industrializing ECE on 
business, because of the lack of ready (i.e., existing in secondary sources) information 
comparable to that available for peasant-migrants in that period, a comparative analysis has 
been ommitted. I am planning, however, to extend this study in the future to include as well a 
comparison of the impact o f the 19th/20th- versus 20th/21th-centuries professional migrants 
on the formation in East Central Europe of the economic society as one arena of the 
democratic order.
18. These estimates, compiled from Juhasz 1996, 1997; Redei 1995; Maresova 1996; Okolski 
1996b; Hillmann and Rudolph 1997; Wilk 1997, and personal communications from the first 
and last two authors (March 7-16, 1998), should be treated with caution however, because the 
available statistics o f foreign arrivals in ECE countries do not distinguish between repatriates 
and natives o f sender-countries, and because managers of multinational companies and 
employees o f international organizations do not need work permits in East Central Europe.
19. I omit here political lobbying on behalf o f their fellow-ethnics at home by East European 
emigre minorities in the West, because, as the case of the Soviet Jews clearly indicates, its 
effects were mainly ad hoc relaxations of state [anti-)minority policies rather than 
democratization thereof—see Shain 1993; Krupnik 1995.
20. There existed, of course, important exceptions. A polyvalent civic-cultural and universalist 
national orientation has been consistently represented, for example, by the Polish emigre 
journal K u ltu ra  published in Paris since 1947 (see Pomian 1997).
21. Information obtained from, repsectively, Silvia Mihalikova and Victor Susak, personal 
communications to this author, March 3 and March 6, 1998; see also Prize! 1997,
22. The estimates o f the numbers of highly skilled expatriates in East Central Europe have 
been compiled from Juhasz 1996, 1997; Wilk 1997; Redei 1995; Hillmann and Rudolph 1997; 
Iglicka 1997; Maresova 1996; and personal communications from the first five authors, March 




























































































ECE (im)migration statistics are probably the least useful regarding the numbers of short-term 
business trips to East Central Europe by Western visitors. According to the 1996 World 
Tourist Organization report, more than 15 million vistors from the West entered Poland 
declaring business as the purpose o f their trips (Markiewicz 1997); the actual nature of this 
business, however, was unspecified: it could have been first reconaissance visits, one-day 
checks in situ of the already established enterprises, searching for prospective partners, 
employee training sessions etc.
23. The impact o f business- and professional-purpose sojourns in ECE of Western experts on 
their own attitudes is beyond the scope of this paper, but it may be of interest to note some 
studies' reports on the "spoiling" or subverting effects o f such longer-term visits, especially by 
way of low-key corruption or nepotistic "potlatch" games the foreigners are drawn into while 
working with the natives (see Wedel 1992; on a similar impact o f Russian-Jewish immigrants 
in Berlin on German welfare services' officials, see Kessler 1997 and personal communication 
to this author, July 3, 1997).
24. This wide discrepancy results in part from the fact that Western expats sent to East central 
Europe (and other semi-peripheral regions) receive as a "compensation" 20% to 40% higher 
salaries than they would have had they remained in their home countries (after Hillmann and 
Rudolph 1997, 86; also personal communication of Hedwig Rudolph to this author, March 2, 
1998)).
25. Reporting on her research on multinational companies in Poland and Lithuania and their 
native employees, Félicitas Hillmann (1997) argues that expatriate migration into these 
countries has been "much more a 'ferment' o f transformation processes than a direct step 
towards colonization of the periphery through multinational enterprises” (Hillmann 1997, 21). 
Ewa Wilk’s (1997) conversations with Polish employees o f such companies suggest a much 
more ambiguous, ferment-and-dependency situation in this regard—in her respodents eyes, 
anyway. I believe however that it is too much early still to assess in any conclusive terms the 
impact o f these multinational companies on the "catching up" of the distance to the highly 
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